There are numerous, uniquely defined terms associated with UW (Figure 1-1, page 1-2). The figure, “Joint Force Irregular Warfare Operations,” displays the five recognized core IW activities as discussed in DOD policy. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 2008. As mentioned earlier, current strategic thinking tends to disregard the counterinsurgency experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. Your email address will not be published. “If American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely;” Similar to disruption by UW, accidental success is a distinct possibility that must be guarded against. Yet, the pattern is much older. Irregular Warfare Reference Library and Case Studies, Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service capture ISIS child recruiter, Barnett Rubin’s Theses on Peacemaking in Afghanistan: A Manifesto, The Norms of Proxy War: Guidelines for the Resort to Unconventional Warfare. Unconventional warfare (United States Department of Defense doctrine) - Wikipedia. The anti-war movement “was essential to our strategy.” The senior leadership followed the anti-war movement in the U.S. and “were elated” when Jane Fonda, Ramsey Clark and others visited. The definition of unconventional warfare and the scope of UW activities has long been disputed (Witty, 2010).. 12. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) v. 2.0, U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, co­ authored this concept. as articulated in the irregular Warfare Joint operating concept (iW Joc), the U.s. As the contemporary Dutch colonial officer A. Struivenberg noted in a study [in Dutch] of operations during the Aceh War of 1873-1904, “The failure to recognize that the outcomes of European [conventional] warfare cannot be directly transferred to the fight against the indigenous enemy with his very specific character, [led the Dutch colonial army] to give great credit to the use of massive fire.” Thus, it seems that Western military forces are doomed to reinvent the wheel every time they are confronted with insurgencies, despite their extensive — if often forgotten — historical record of operations against such irregular enemies. It is fought with guns and bombs. Instead, we should develop an approach that will enable us to quickly adapt to a specific situation in order to fight in a way that best matches whatever form of warfare is adopted by our enemies. This occurs when the strategic value to the sponsor of seeking their ends through unconventional warfare is overcome by the costs of the campaign. Conventional Warfare is war with 2 or more countries with established militaries and governments. In modern warfare, the lines between regular, conventional and irregular, unconventional warfare are increasingly blurred. UW falls within the construct of Irregular Warfare (IW) and is one of U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) Core Activities. Therefore, the lessons of the recent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan should be properly captured, understood, and learned. There is little political will to again embark on such a costly and uncertain adventure, while senior military commanders, most of whose formative years as young officers were spent during the latter period of the Cold War, are increasingly regarding the recent counterinsurgency era as a “wrong turn” from the core business of high-end conventional warfare. The latest period of counterinsurgency has ended and Western militaries are once again moving towards the downside of the cycle. 6. Website created by. It is important to understand that a resistance movement is first and foremost a political movement, with all of the attendant vagaries. The conventional/unconventional dichotomy is also unhelpfully complemented by the war/not war dichotomy. address irregular threats. These strategies represent a departure from those that underpinned much of America’s post-9/11 wars—with their heavy components of irregular warfare—but that does not mean a departure from irregular warfare itself. The similarities endured in Afghanistan are obvious, beginning with defining and isolating the battle space. As used by Western Special Operations Forces (SOF) the terms special warfare, guerrilla warfare or unconventional warfare (UW) all mean roughly the same thing: operations by specialised forces to advise, assist and accompany local partners conducting resistance warfare against a hostile state or occupying force. HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: RADICALS IN THE RANKS, LIKE YOUR BRAIN HAS JUST GONE TO THE GYM (WARGAMING ROOM), A LABORATORY FOR MILITARY PROFESSIONALS (WARGAMING ROOM), A FATAL DOSE IN 2 MILLIGRAMS: FENTANYL AND NATIONAL SECURITY, SERVICE TO THE NATION: CLOSING THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIVIDE (EISENHOWER SERIES), NEW WEAPONS FOR NEW DOMAINS? This is a sine qua non for bolstering Western militaries’ abilities to perform both conventional and unconventional missions in order to counter the hybrid threats that dominate the contemporary international security environment. A Brief History of Unconventional Warfare. Thus, it is essential that we stop thinking of conventional and unconventional warfare as a dichotomy. I would like to think that a low and slow approach to defense reinvestment and modernization could work: missiles this year, MP4s the next, etc. Of course, the reemergence of the Russian threat to some extent justifies this reorientation. Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society. The U.S. Military Should Prepare for both Conventional and Irregular Warfare 1320 Words | 6 Pages. After the end of such a campaign (and often regardless of the outcome), however, armed forces then quickly return to business as usual. However, overthrow is prone to several significant risks. As with the overthrow objective, perhaps moreso, there are several attendant risks that must be taken into account. Similar to the premature termination of support in an overthrow campaign, abandonment occurs when the sponsor’s decides to terminate the UW program, but does not sufficiently plan for a transition to peace. Misalignment of interests is of particular risk, since most resistance movements that are well-developed enough to seriously disrupt a state’s operations seek to overthrow their government, not merely impede it; however, this is not a universal rule. The thesis statement is: Unconventional Warfare is a viable tool for achieving national security objectives under certain circumstances. What are unconventional warfare and foreign subversion? Editor’s Note: In February 2019, the Institute for the Study of War and Strategy (ISWS) of the University of St. Andrews and the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) brought together eleven scholars, each representing the view of a different country or in one instance the institutional apparatus of NATO, to discuss “Lessons Learned from Afghanistan.” In the spirit of the St. Andrews conference, War Room presents a series of reflections inspired by the conference from attendees (Martijn Kitzen, the author of the following essay, was also a panelist) from three different countries. It would be instructive historical research and wider-ranging than our normal battlefield level maneuver reprising which is particularly useful to regimental and wing level folks, but less so to Corps, Air Forces, Fleets and the NCA.). Regional and Popular Forces (Ruff/Puff) were in control of 90% of the populace countryside by 1972; Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, uses unconventional weapons, targets the civilian population as well as the armed forces, and specializes in unconventional tactics. Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict. The resistance is then left out to dry, exposed to severe retribution on the part of the government. Irregular Warfare IS regular warfare. This so-called hybrid warfare is embraced by states and non-state actors alike, as seen in Russia’s use of irregular tactics to destabilize its neighbors. The figure, “Joint Force Irregular Warfare Operations,” displays the five recognized core IW activities as discussed in DOD policy. We didn’t knock out the railroad lines between China and North Vietnam; interests and threats. Blowback can occur where the resistance, or some portion of it, seeks ends that are inimical to the sponsor’s interest. Yet the contemporary security situation is complex and requires a broader approach than simply mimicking Cold War strategy. Premature termination of support is yet another risk. Later this year, ISWS and SSI will produce a conference report incorporating the contributions of all presenters. Yet the stubborn hybrid character of modern war is a reason to row against this tide. In the Dutch East Indies, for example, a remarkable pattern of colonial campaigning evolved, in which the Dutch colonial army would typically first launch conventional operations in order to conquer and pacify an area. This so-called hybrid warfare is embraced by states and non-state actors alike, as seen in Russia’s use of irregular tactics to destabilize its neighbors. The new Army vision calls for a “campaign-quality Army- that incorporates both Joint and expeditionary capabilities. Instead, this strategic emphasis on great-power competition is changing when, where, and how the United States conducts irregular warfare—counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and stability operations. It is vital that this leadership be acceptable to both the resistance and the sponsor. These threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by Overthrowing a governing power is the clearest and in many ways simplest outcome that can be sought through the use of unconventional warfare. Martijn Kitzen is Associate Professor of War Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy. Irregular warfare is warfare in which one or more combatants are irregular military rather than regular forces. An important article from a current DOD official, Kevin Bilms, with responsibility for the new Irregular Warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy. That said, as our participation in the ME is waning, we must now re-balance the books and spend a bit more on conventional forces while keeping our unconventional forces intact, and more than likely in contact. The article can be accessed at the Military Times HERE. The term “irregular warfare” is a phrase that combines two simple words that are used very frequently. In conventional warfare, the fighters usually wear uniforms, which identifies them as fighters in an army, under the laws of war. Gray zone competition is also a key going forward and we are not in my estimation positioning ourselves well to compete below the armed conflict threshold. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or U.S. Department of Defense nor do they reflect the official policy or position of the Dutch government or the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Austerity has functioned as a catalyst for forgetting, as militaries have prioritized preserving conventional capabilities above all else. The doctrine provides that an insurgency is composed of underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force. In this case, the sponsor will assist the resistance in disrupting the government operations, then, once the objectives of the campaign are achieved, work to transition the resistance into some disposition where it is safe from retribution by the government. Because it shares characteristics with both overthrow and disruption, the risks reflect many of the same concerns. In United States military doctrine, unconventional warfare (abbreviated UW) is one of the core activities of irregular warfare. Despite the fact that colonial armies spent most of their time fighting irregular opponents amongst indigenous populations, their doctrine, training, and organization were designed for defending overseas territories against the armed forces of other nations. Another risk is that of overcommitment. Instead, we should start considering these forms of warfare as complementary and making up a continuum to be deployed against highly capable hybrid threats. An unconventional warfare campaign seeks to employ some proxy force to achieve mutually-beneficial objectives. Limited conventional warfare tactics can be used unconventionally to demonstrate might and power, rather than to substantially reduce the enemy's ability to fight. is defined as the comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Since the overthrow of the government was not sought (and may not be welcome), little or no planning has been conducted for the assumption of power. These demands can range from increased regional autonomy to changes in the political order (e.g., subjecting the king to parliamentary rule without deposing him) to the adoption, removal or modification of specific political actions (e.g., land reform). Conventional warfare is national military vs national military. The event also included several workshops and sessions on administra- unconventional warfare (UW). Though state sponsorship of irregulars is one of the oldest and commonest forms of warfare, its modern western iteration dates to the work of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and British Special Operations Executive (SOE) with resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Second World War. South Vietnam’s generals were “inept” and political; Learn how your comment data is processed. (In fact, why don’t our War Colleges begin a series of one-hour fictionalized but historically-based military lessons learned by the likes of Ramses (several of them), Sulieman, Victoria, Elizabeth I, Catherine, or several of the Ming and Han Emperors. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 8. They are blooded Soldiers/Sailors/Airmen/Marines. We didn’t blockade Haiphong at the onset (where even British vessels could be found); Other factors also play a role, such as each country’s strategic circumstances, historical experiences, intellectual and cultural climate, and general Zeitgeist. Your email address will not be published. In the case of coercion, transition activities seek to ensure, as with disruption, that the resistance is protected from retribution, and also that the political gains made are not ephemeral but permanent. My short thesis: Irregular Warfare is the military contribution to the national level political warfare strategy. Nadia Schadlow’s War and the Art of Governance is a great reminder of the military’s role at the end of combat operations. In the case of coercion, in addition to the risk that disruption will cause the collapse of the government, there is also the risk that the political gains of the resistance are such that the regime is unsustainable. Shawna Sinnott and Nick Lopez | 10.09.20. Irregular warfare (IW) presents different challenges to our military and to the Air Force. This report provides study results, research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare (IW) as introduced/described in the 2006 Quadr… The best single source on this is the Army Pub "Special Warfare" published in 1962 at Ft Bragg, NC out of the newly formed (wait for it) United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Western military forces should be capable of adopting the approach necessary for a specific context, opponent, and time, whether employing a mixture of conventional or unconventional means. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short term threat to national interests and conventional warfare the most threatening in the long term. As the resistance evolves and adapts to the changing environment and the political views of its various constituencies, its objectives may shift sufficiently to place them in opposition to those of the sponsor. Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority. The Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) is dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of the challenges presented by irregular warfare (IW) and non-state actors, also known as armed groups, in the 21st Century. Abandonment is yet another risk of unconventional warfare that seeks to merely disrupt an adversary’s operations. Army is beginning to shape itself for complex irregular warfare. Irregular warfare, within the United States military, inhabits several mutually inclusive spheres: security force assistance (SFA), counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), peace keeping, stability operations, and counter-terrorism (CT). When President Ford failed to respond to the attack of Phuoc Long in January 1975, the North knew that their overall victory was at-hand; It can also be observed during the height of European colonialism in the nineteenth century. Because the demands are more limited than overthrow, and more specific than disruption, coercion is the most complicated and fragile outcome. Western military forces are principally optimized to fight against similar adversaries, and therefore have to reorient themselves whenever confronted with elusive insurgent opponents. 5. Unconventional warfare is fighting “by, with, or through” local, indigenous, irregular troops. Instead, it is a valuable tool in achieving national security objectives while limiting overcommitment or over extension. Irregular Warfare is one way the military can apply its power complementarily with diplomatic, economic, financial and other ways to secure strategic outcomes, says the author of this commentary. Hence, its first appearance can possibly be traced very far back and is difficult to pin down. A new Pentagon Irregular Warfare Annex report explains that great power threats not only pose major force-on-force threat possibilities but also have a history of engaging in unconventional … While it is axiomatic that you can’t support what you don’t understand, it is also true that this study of revolutions can easily cause the student of UW to blend the two topics. Many in the U.S. military thought of the time after major combat operations in Iraq as not war and someone else’s job. 7. Episode 11 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast is a deep dive into insurgency and counterinsurgency... Read More. However, while sophistication and bravery are necessary, the farther forward the sponsors troops are, the more likely it is that the support in the rear is not as successful as it needs to be. This scenario tends to lead to further instability and violence in the target country. This can be caused by several mechanisms, such as mission creep, poor strategic guidance, sunk-cost fallacies, shifting political imperatives, and others. The North only had to win the American media in order to eventually be victorious because they sway politicians (who love to be loved and, of course, reelected) and feeble-minded university professors who love to pontificate and sell their books). It requires — in those situations where we must encounter it — a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.” President John F. Kennedy, 1962 US Military Academy graduation. And, if we are good at implementing their social experimentation, some cheap plastic missile fins in the interim. Not one of these domains exists in a vacuum; they are all facets of the same form of warfare. The term “irregular warfare” is a phrase that combines two simple words that are used very frequently. Those lessons are also at risk of being lost, if they were ever learned at all, as we transition back to the focus on large scale conventional conflict with near peer competitors. As Sir Hew Strachan (one of the organizers of the St. Andrews conference) notes in The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, one of the best-known examples of this recurring cycle is the U.S. military’s troubled adaptation to counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War and the neglect of those experiences in its aftermath. The changes most directly affect US special operations forces. Cohen said in the report that conventional forces are greatly needed when it comes to irregular warfare as well. Mission creep on the part of the resistance is a related risk. ‎This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The conference began with a keynote address by General (Retired) David Petraeus, in which he warned that “you cannot just throw away counterinsurgency lessons and act if you are in the Cold War.” Yet this casting away of lessons is exactly what I have been witnessing in my own country, the Netherlands, as well as within NATO in general. It would not do to support a movement’s bid to overthrow your adversary if the new regime would be worse, nor to support a resistance movement who is seeking political ends that are counter to the sponsor’s interests. The canonical example of this dynamic is the outcome of the U.S. sponsorship of the Afghan Mujahideen, from which arose the Taliban and al Qaeda. The legal definition of UW is: en.wikipedia.org. It includes the specific missions of unconventional warfare (UW), stabilization, foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), and 10. Using these three factors, there appear to be two predominant models of unconventional warfare: the Russian model and the Chinese model. In case you missed it, be sure to read the earlier reflection of Gunhild Gjørv. [19] DoD Readers and Listeners: please use a non-DoD email to subscribe. Marion is considered one of the fathers of guerrilla warfare and is credited in the lineage of the United States Army Rangers and other American Special Forces . In addition to the surgical application of traditional weapons, other armaments that specifically target military can be used are: air… According to U.S. military doctrine, one of the core activities of irregular warfare, unconventional warfare is defined as the “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” [JP 1-02] However, the “and” in “underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force” is somewhat deceiving. We have an expensive intellectual argument about a potential threat that is not visible to the populace – therefore not visible to Congress. Meanwhile, non-state actors, such as the Islamic State, have demonstrated their capability to launch conventional operations. It supports the resistance in building it’s infrastructure and organization, connecting with sympathetic populations, training and equipping its forces, and conducting operations. First, we have had this Steppes War versus Mekong Delta War “discussion” since the French and Indian War. And far more common, than conventional war is and is ever going to be. They developed it jointly with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and Agencies through the use of joint Using the theme “The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007,” the 2007 Conference of Army Historians featured over sixty formal papers exploring the nature of unconventional warfare and its significance throughout history. In each of these outcomes, the sponsor must be sure that their interests and those of the resistance are sufficiently aligned. 3. unconventional warfare (UW). Years of rebuilding compelled them to use NVA troops to fill the ranks of the VC. 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